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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ACCOUNTABILITY
AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES
MARK SEIDENFELD†
INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, mechanisms for reviewing agency
rulemaking have multiplied. The traditional mechanism of oversight
by congressional committees1 has been supplemented by, inter alia,
rigorous judicial review of agency reasons for adopting rules,2 a man-
date that the agency perform cost-benefit analyses of major rules—
analyses which are in turn scrutinized by the Office of Management
and Budget3—and most recently fast-track review by Congress.4 This
plethora of oversight mechanisms naturally raises several related
Copyright © 2001 by Mark Seidenfeld.
† Professor, Florida State University College of Law. This Essay is based on a paper pre-
sented at the Duke Law Journal’s Administrative Law Conference held at Duke University
School of Law on March 5, 2001. The Duke University School of Law’s Program in Public Law
provided additional financial support for the 2001 conference. I want to thank the Florida State
University College of Law for supporting the research for this Essay. I also would like to thank
Colleen Kelley, for guiding me through some of the intricacies of decisionmaking theory and
encouraging me with this project, and Janna Nugent, for helping me with my research.
1. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2257–60 (2001)
(describing theories of congressional oversight of agency rulemaking).
2. The Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious scope of review initially
was understood to entail a minimal inquiry into the rationality of an agency decision, but it has
come to entail a more intrusive inquiry into reasons for the decision. See Fred Anderson et al.,
Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Judicial Re-
view, 11 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 89, 112–13 (2000) (describing arbitrary and capricious re-
view as a “spectrum rather than a unitary standard”); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case
for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1246 (1999) (arguing that “the broad
judicial review that has resulted from the [Administrative Procedure Act] is theoretically unjus-
tifiable and is contrary to the separation of powers principle of the United States Constitution”);
Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1295–
1315 (1986) (describing a progression during the 1960s and 1970s from deference toward agency
administrators to a more aggressive judicial review of agency decisions).
3. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2285–90 (discussing President Clinton’s program for Office
of Management and Budget review of agency rules).
4. See Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 96–102 (1997) (describing legislative fast-track review of agency rules).
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questions: Are all of these avenues for reviewing agency rulemaking
necessary? What benefits accrue from these various review mecha-
nisms? What mix of review mechanisms is likely to encourage agen-
cies to adopt rules that best serve the underlying purposes of the stat-
utes that the agencies are authorized to administer?
In a companion article to this Essay,5 I use psychologists’ under-
standing of accountability to analyze judicial review’s potential to im-
prove the quality of agency staff decisionmaking in formulating rules.
That article concludes that the hard look version of judicial review,6
currently applied by the courts, encourages agencies to take greater
care when formulating rules, which in turn decreases the likelihood
that the rulemaking process will reflect psychological decisionmaking
biases.7 Judicial review, however, also has some undesirable conse-
quences: it imposes significant burdens on agency information gath-
ering and analysis,8 which increases the time and cost of rulemaking,
and can even dissuade agencies from using informal rulemaking when
adopting policies that significantly affect the public.9 Hence, the con-
clusion that judicial review of agency rules encourages careful deci-
sionmaking does not justify judicial review if one can derive the same
benefit—decreasing psychological decisionmaking biases—from other
forms of oversight that do not have the same degree of undesirable
consequences. In other words, to know whether hard look review is
worthwhile, one must analyze the likely impact of alternative over-
sight mechanisms to determine whether they provide similar benefits
with fewer unintended consequences. In addition, if one concludes
that alternative mechanisms cannot substitute for judicial review,
then one must face the question of whether use of such alternatives is
5. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
6. For a description of the operational demands of hard look review, see Mark Seidenfeld,
Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice
and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 491–92 (1997).
7. Seidenfeld, supra note 5 (manuscript at 59).
8. E. Donald Elliot, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1493–94 (1992); Tho-
mas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385,
1412 (1992).
9. McGarity, supra note 8, at 1386 (describing how agencies use less participatory means
to set policy to avoid the rigidity that results from judicial review of notice and comment rule-
making); Richard J. Pierce, The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How
Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 10–
11 (1991) (arguing that hard look review has discouraged the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission from using rulemaking to restructure the electric utility industry).
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justified. By illuminating the impact of oversight mechanisms other
than judicial review, the literature on the psychology of accountability
can help one discern whether such mechanisms provide independent
benefits that warrant maintaining political review, and what form
such review should take.
In this Essay, I use the psychology literature on accountability to
evaluate the likely impact of the various forms of political review on
the quality of agency decisionmaking. I begin by briefly reviewing the
basic findings of psychological research regarding the impact of ac-
countability on decisionmaking. I then apply those findings to the
three mechanisms of political review mentioned above—OMB scru-
tiny of cost-benefit analyses that accompany rules, congressional
committee oversight of rulemaking, and congressional fast-track re-
view. Finally, I discuss the implications of those findings, addressing
in particular the contention of some scholars that judicial review is
unnecessary in light of political review, and opining on the desirability
of each mechanism for political review. I conclude that, unlike judicial
review, none of the mechanisms for political oversight that I analyze
promises to improve the quality of agency staff formulation of most
rules. These mechanisms, nonetheless, encourage agencies to develop
rules that accord with the preferences of influential political actors,
such as the president, congressional leaders, and chairs of committees
responsible for oversight of agency programs. Whether one views
such encouragement as a justification for political review depends, in
large measure, on the theoretical model of the administrative state to
which one subscribes.
I.  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ACCOUNTABILITY10
Psychologists have recognized that individuals do not make deci-
sions by choosing the optimal outcome from available alternatives.11
Instead, decisionmakers conserve cognitive resources by using deci-
sionmaking shortcuts. Without such shortcuts, the burden of collect-
ing and analyzing information would be so great that individuals
might be unable to make any complex decisions at all. Individuals
10. The psychology of decisionmaking and the impact of accountability are developed
more fully in my article analyzing the impact of judicial review on agency staff rulemaking deci-
sions. Seidenfeld, supra note 5 (manuscript at 5–39).
11. Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 99
(1955) [hereinafter Simon, A Behavioral Model], reprinted in 2 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS
OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY 239, 239 (1982) [hereinafter SIMON, MODELS].
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thus learn to use decisionmaking devices that usually lead to accept-
able results without demanding that the person collect an undue
amount of information or engage in paralyzing analysis of every pos-
sible alternative in light of the available information.12 Individuals use
shortcuts that are unique to them, decisionmaking rules that reflect
their training and experiences;13 they also use shortcuts that they
share with most other individuals, decisionmaking heuristics that tend
to lead all decisionmakers to acceptable outcomes in most situations.14
Psychologists also have recognized that personal decision rules
and the use of generally applicable heuristics can lead to biases in de-
cisionmaking.15 Individuals apply decision rules outside of appropriate
contexts, and they use heuristics in ways that lead to demonstrably in-
ferior choices.16 Such biases include the propensity of individuals to
overly attribute their knowledge—“beliefs, opinions, suppositions, at-
titudes and related states of mind”—to others.17 In addition, deci-
12. See 2 SIMON, MODELS, supra note 11, at 295–96 (explaining that decisionmakers satis-
fice rather than optimize).
13. See Xueguang Zhou, Organizational Decision Making as Rule Following, in
ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONMAKING 257, 258–59 (Zur Shapira ed., 1997) (contrasting deci-
sionmaking as choice with decisionmaking as “rule following,” “the process of . . . recognizing
the social role one is to play and matching appropriate rules to the situation”). By decision-
making rule, I mean the use of predetermined categories into which a person places factual cir-
cumstances to derive an outcome. See JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING:
HOW DECISIONS HAPPEN 58 (1994) (defining rule following as a three step process that asks the
decisionmaker to evaluate the kind of situation she is in, the kind of person she is with respect
to the decision, and what a person of that kind does in a situation of the kind identified).
14. See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 109
(1993) (noting that heuristics reduce the time necessary for decisionmaking and “yield fairly
good estimates”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY].
15. For a general discussion of heuristics and the biases to which they might lead, see
PLOUS, supra note 14, at 107–88; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 14, at 3–20.
16. See MARCH, supra note 13, at 82–91 (explaining ways in which biases in recalling and
evaluating experiences and interpreting feedback from applying decision rules can result in de-
velopment of maladaptive rules); Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of
Social Conflict, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2079, 2084 (1996) (proposing that decisionmaking habits can
reflect mindless repetition); Hillel J. Einhorn, Learning from Experience and Suboptimal Rules
in Decision Making, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 14, at 268, 273–76 (ex-
plaining how feedback from outcomes can reinforce suboptimal decisionmaking rules); Ronald
A. Heiner, The Origin of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 568–70 (1983) (sug-
gesting that selection processes for developing rules that govern human behavior may not result
in optimal behavior and may even allow dysfunctional behavior to persist).
17. Raymond S. Nickerson, How We Know—and Sometimes Misjudge—What Others
Know: Imputing One’s Own Knowledge to Others, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 737, 737 (1999); see also
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sionmakers, especially experts like those who draft agency rules, tend
to be overconfident about predictions they make based on available
evidence.18 Decisionmakers also often make technical errors, such as
ignoring base rates when making predictions based on statistical evi-
dence,19 or considering sunk costs when evaluating investment deci-
sions.20 Although experts are less apt to make such errors, on occasion
they do make them.21 In evaluating the probability that an event will
occur, individuals may rely inappropriately on the “availability heu-
ristic”—the ease with which they can recall similar events.22 Deci-
sionmakers also may be influenced by irrelevant information,23 tend
to confirm initial hypotheses in the face of contradictory evidence,24
Pamela Hinds, The Curse of Expertise: The Effects of Expertise and Debiasing Methods on Pre-
dictions of Novice Performance, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 205, 218 (1999) (demonstrating
that expertise in a given field can exacerbate this “egocentrism bias”).
18. For unpredictable events, experts tend to rely on “rich models of the system in ques-
tion,” and to ignore the quality of the data, which provides experts with false confidence about
the likelihood of predictions that flow from these models. Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The
Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 430
(1992); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 111, on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that experts are more likely than others to exhibit overcon-
fidence).
19. When evaluating the probability of an event given some evidence, individuals are likely
to ignore base rates when they are incidental rather than causally related to evidence and when
the evidence is more specific than the base rate information. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahne-
man, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 14, at
153, 155–59. Even when individuals do take base rates into account, however, they frequently
fail to adjust their probability evaluations sufficiently. Id.
20. Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, in JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 97, 99–103 (Terry Connolly et al. eds.,
2d ed. 2000).
21. For example, business administration students asked to make investment decisions
failed to heed the sunk cost adage, even when they were told to evaluate the pros and cons for
their decisions thoroughly. Itamar Simonson & Barry M. Staw, Deescalation Strategies: A Com-
parison of Techniques for Reducing Commitment to Losing Courses of Action, 77 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 419, 423–24 (1992); see also Itamar Simonson, The Effect of Accountability on Sus-
ceptibility to Decision Errors, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROC. 416, 432 (1992) (re-
porting similar results when business administration students were asked to solve problems not
explicitly involving investment but raising the issue of whether to ignore sunk costs).
22. For a general discussion of the availability heuristic and the biases that it can cause, see
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Prob-
ability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 14, at 163, 163–64.
23. Philip Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of the Dilution
Effect, 57 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 388, 389 (1989); Henry Zukier, The Dilution Effect: The
Role of the Correlation and the Dispersion of Predictor Variables in the Use of Nondiagnostic
Information, 43 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1163, 1164–65 (1982).
24. See Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, in ADVANCES
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41, 44 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986) (discussing re-
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and irrationally avoid choices that represent extremes when a deci-
sion involves a trade-off between two incommensurable values.25 All
of these biases can reduce the quality of decisionmaking by agency
staff responsible for formulating rules.
When decisionmakers are held accountable for their choices,
their propensity to fall prey to psychological biases changes. Ac-
countability is a broad notion that describes any situation in which a
decisionmaker believes that he must justify his decision to others and
that failure to provide a satisfactory justification will cause the deci-
sionmaker to suffer negative consequences.26 Those consequences
need not be material. Disdainful looks and feelings of disappointment
in one’s own performance may suffice to elicit responses mediated by
accountability.27
Within the broad ambit of accountability falls a multitude of
means by which an organization, such as an agency, or, more gener-
ally, the administrative state, oversees decisionmakers. Depending on
the precise means used, accountability might induce a decisionmaker
to take greater care and avoid many of the biases identified above;28 it
might cause the decisionmaker to become defensive about his initially
preferred outcome and therefore to expend resources finding infor-
mation and performing analyses to bolster that outcome, even when
subsequent information suggests that the individual should choose an
alternative.29 Or, it might influence the decisionmaker to shade his
choice toward an outcome that he believes is preferred by the audi-
search findings that people search for information that supports rather than contradicts their
prior decisions).
25. Itamar Simonson, Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and Compromise
Effects, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 158, 161–62 (1989); Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in
Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281, 292 (1993).
26. “[A]ccountability refers to the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on
to justify one’s beliefs, feelings and actions to others. . . . Accountability also usually implies that
people who do not provide a satisfactory justification . . . will suffer negative consequences . . . .”
Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255 (1999).
27. Id. at 255; cf. BERNARD GUERIN, SOCIAL FACILITATION 164 (1993) (reporting that
individuals may perform differently when in front of a nonevaluative audience in an attempt to
“reduce any discrepancy between the internalized social norm [of performing well] and current
behavior”); Kate Szymanski & Stephen G. Harkins, Social Loafing and Self-Evaluation with a
Social Standard, 53 J. PER. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 891, 891, 894 (1987) (demonstrating that an indi-
vidual’s ability to evaluate his own performance—to compare his performance to a social stan-
dard—was a sufficient motivation to alleviate social loafing).
28. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 26, at 257.
29. Id.
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ence to which he is accountable.30 In assessing which of these re-
sponses is likely, one must look at: (1) whether the decisionmaker is
aware that he will be held accountable when he makes his decision,
(2) whether he perceives the audience to which he is accountable as
legitimate, (3) whether the audience demands a justification of the
outcome of the decision rather than the processes by which the deci-
sionmaker reached that outcome, and (4) whether he knows the out-
come preferences of his audience, or even the identity of the audience
well enough to surmise what its outcome preferences might be.31
If an individual commits to a course of action before he is aware
that he will have to explain that action, the individual is apt to expend
great effort to justify any decision already made.32 Individuals experi-
ence cognitive dissonance if they perceive their behavior as inconsis-
tent with values that they hold.33 A value that is shared by most pro-
fessionals is the desire to perform their jobs well. Agency staff
members, who are generally professionals, assigned a task of making
recommendations or preparing analyses based on externally specified
factors—factors that might be stated in a statute or regulation, or dic-
tated by their superiors—thus would suffer dissonance if they could
not persuasively explain their recommendations and analyses based
on these factors. The potential for such dissonance could induce
agency staff members to become defensive and bolster decisions
made before they were aware that they would be accountable for
those decisions, even if subsequent evidence indicated that those de-
cisions were suboptimal.
An individual accountable to an audience that he does not con-
sider legitimate often will not take the same care in making a decision
as one who is accountable to a legitimate audience.34 Decisionmakers
consider an audience illegitimate when the audience has no reason to
review the decision, or when the decisionmaker perceives that review
is intended to modify his beliefs.35 When the audience has no reason
to be concerned with the decision, such as when the decisionmaker is
asked to report to strangers with neither responsibility for the matter
30. Id. at 256–57.
31. Id. at 256–59.
32. Id. at 257.
33. See PLOUS, supra note 14, at 28–29 (noting that cognitive dissonance can affect behav-
ior after a person commits to a decision).
34. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 26, at 258.
35. George Cvetkovich, Cognitive Accommodation, Language, and Social Responsibility, 2
SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 150 (1978); Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 26, at 258–59.
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nor personal interests in the decision, the decisionmaker simply may
not work hard to make a good decision.36 When the decisionmaker
perceives that the audience is trying to alter his beliefs, he is apt to
defend decisions that depend on those beliefs more vigorously than if
there were no review.37 As can occur when the decisionmaker be-
comes aware of review after committing to a decision, this perception
can lead to a counterproductive bolstering of initial commitments.
Accountability tends to enhance the quality of decisionmaking
only if the decisionmaker is not aware of the preferences of the audi-
ence to whom he must report. When individuals are accountable to an
audience whose preferences are known, these individuals do not en-
gage in more complex thought about their decision tasks. Instead they
alter the outcome of their decisions to come closer to an outcome that
would satisfy their audience.38 In some situations, decisionmakers
modify their choices in a manner that is obviously inefficient to avoid
an outcome that they might find unpleasant to explain to their audi-
ence.39 Individuals who are accountable to an audience with unknown
views are significantly more self-critical while making their deci-
sions.40 They are more open to qualifying decisions about which they
are uncertain.41 Even when a decisionmaker does not know his audi-
ence’s preferences, if he knows its identity then he may attempt to
surmise what that audience would prefer, and will modify his chosen
outcome toward his best guess of what the audience desires.42 One can
avoid the propensity of decisionmakers to choose outcomes that they
36. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 26, at 258–59.
37. Id.
38. Richard Klimoski & Lawrence Inks, Accountability Forces in Performance Appraisal,
45 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROC. 194, 202–03 (1990); Philip E. Tetlock, Accountabil-
ity and Complexity of Thought, 45 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 74, 80–81 (1983); Philip E. Tetlock
et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity,
and Bolstering, 57 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 632, 638 (1989).
39. For example, individuals who were told they were responsible for awarding financial
aid to students who would have to drop out of school if they did not receive sufficient aid, and
whose budget was not sufficient to provide aid to all applicants, tended to award insufficient
funds to all the applicants when they were accountable to those applicants. Even when individu-
als were accountable to the provider of funds rather than the recipients, they were more apt to
award insufficient funds to some of the applicants. Sheldon Adelberg & C. Daniel Batson, Ac-
countability and Helping: When Needs Exceed Resources, 36 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 343,
347–48 (1978).
40. Tetlock, supra note 38, at 80–81.
41. See Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability Amplifies the Status Quo Ef-
fect When Change Creates Victims, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 18 (1994) (identifying
strategies decisionmakers use when asked to make a difficult decision).
42. Tetlock, supra note 38, at 80.
SEIDENFELD.DOC 02/05/02 10:38 AM
2001] PSYCHOLOGY OF ACCOUNTABILITY 1067
think will please their audience by shielding the identity of the audi-
ence from the decisionmaker.
Finally, the impact of accountability also depends on whether the
audience evaluates the outcome of the decision rather than the proc-
ess by which the individual reached it.43 Outcome-based review hinges
on whether the audience agrees with the decision, independent of the
reasons for it. Process-based review focuses on the search for infor-
mation, processing of information, and reasoning that led to the deci-
sion, and does not depend on whether the audience agrees with the
outcome. When review is process based, decisionmakers tend to use
proper decision strategies and evaluate available alternatives more
critically than when they are subject to no review.44 In contrast, when
review is outcome based, decisionmakers tend to engage in greater
post hoc justification and therefore to increase their commitment to
prior courses of action.45 Outcome-based review also encourages indi-
viduals to decrease the effort that they devote to making decisions.46
In reality, pure process- and outcome-based review may be unat-
tainable archetypes.47 A decision that is persuasively reasoned would
be likely to convince at least some reviewers that the outcome chosen
is best. But the flip side of this is also probable; an audience that
agrees with an outcome is more likely to approve of the process used
to reach an outcome with which it agrees than one with which it dis-
agrees. Although psychologists try to keep process and outcome ac-
countability entirely distinct, the literature implicitly recognizes that
in the real world the two archetypes interact. That is why, even if re-
43. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 26, at 258.
44. Id.; Karen Siegal-Jacobs & J. Frank Yates, Effects of Procedural and Outcome Ac-
countability on Judgment Quality, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROC. 1, 14 (1996).
45. See Simonson & Staw, supra note 21, at 423–24 (finding that business students who
were told that they would be evaluated based on their decisionmaking strategy were less apt to
succumb to the sunk cost fallacy than those who were told that they would be evaluated based
on the outcome of their decisions).
46. See Patricia M. Doney & Gary M. Armstrong, Effects of Accountability on Symbolic
Information Search and Information Analysis by Organizational Buyers, 24 J. ACAD.
MARKETING SCI. 57, 62 (1996) (reporting that buyers who were held accountable for the proc-
ess by which they reached their decisions analyzed information more extensively than they did
when not accountable or accountable only for decision outcomes).
47. Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 5 (manuscript at 30–35) (concluding that the evidence on
whether judicial review is driven by judges’ ideology rather than law indicates that such review
is in part process- and in part outcome-based).
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view is process based, a decisionmaker who knows his audience’s
preferences will shade the outcome toward those preferences.48
II.  OMB REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING
In addition to the Administrative Procedure Act’s simple re-
quirement of notice and comment, when an agency promulgates a
rule, various statutes and executive orders require it to prepare nu-
merous analyses, many of which the agency must submit to the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) for review.49 Of all the required
analyses that OMB oversees, the mandate that an agency prepare a
cost-benefit analysis for any rule that is a significant regulatory action
has had the greatest effect on rulemaking.50 OMB review plays an es-
pecially influential role with respect to cost-benefit analyses because,
when OMB finds the agency analysis wanting, that office can prevent
the agency from proceeding with the rulemaking unless the agency
obtains permission to proceed from the president.51 In this Part, I fo-
cus exclusively on OMB review of cost-benefit analyses of rules with
significant economic impact.
Before an agency publishes a proposed rule that will have a sig-
nificant regulatory impact, and again before it adopts the rule in its
final version, the agency must prepare a cost-benefit analysis and
provide this analysis to the Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
48. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 26, at 256–57; see Neal P. Mero & Stephan J. Motowidlo,
Effects of Rater Accountability on the Accuracy and Favorability of Performance Ratings, 80 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 517, 522 (1995) (reporting that, although accountability improved the accu-
racy of performance appraisers who were under no pressure to achieve a certain rating out-
come, accountability magnified the tendency of appraisers who learned, prior to making their
ratings, that their boss thought historical ratings were too low, to inflate their ratings). But cf.
Serena Chen et al., Getting at the Truth or Getting Along: Accuracy- Versus Impression-
Motivated Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 262, 272
(1996) (finding that knowledge of audience-outcome preferences affected most those who were
motivated to have a pleasant interaction with the audience, and least those who were motivated
to think and act objectively).
49. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking,
27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 533, 536–37 (2000) (charting the statutes and executive orders that an
agency must consider in meeting requirements for analysis of regulatory impact).
50. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 646 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1994). This executive order defines a “significant regulatory action” as including “any
regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that may: (1) Have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy.” Id. § 3(f).
51. Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-
Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 45–46 (1995) (discussing Executive Order 12,866’s authorization of
OMB to veto agency regulatory actions).
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fairs (OIRA), within OMB.52 The analysis is reviewed by an OIRA
desk officer, who usually is learned in economic analysis, but who
generally has little knowledge about the problem that necessitated
the rule or of the regulatory environment within which the agency
works.53 Moreover, although desk officers are political appointees un-
der the direct control of the White House, they are sufficiently low
level that one cannot guarantee that a particular desk officer shares
the views of the president with respect to the particular rule he is re-
viewing.54 What OIRA desk officers share, however, is a focus on the
costs of regulation, which makes it likely that they will object to a rule
if there is uncertainty about whether the regulatory benefits are suffi-
cient to justify the costs of the rule.55 If a desk officer takes issue with
the analysis provided by the agency, then he can stymie regulation
unless the agency is willing to escalate the disagreement to the level
where it will be addressed by the Administrator of OIRA and the
agency head.56 Pragmatically speaking, a desk officer has considerable
ability to make agency staff think hard about issues on which the two
disagree.
A. Perceived Legitimacy of OMB Review
The impact of OMB review on agency staff depends first on
whether agency staff consider such review legitimate. When President
Reagan first imposed the substantive cost-benefit requirement on
agency rules, many questioned its legitimacy.57 Even though the man-
52. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B)-(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645–646 (1994), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
53. Desk officers, however, work closely with other staff members at OIRA who have
expertise with respect to the subject matter of particular regulations. Strategic Plan FY 2001–
2005, Office of Management and Budget, at 7, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/
strategicplan-fy2001-2005.pdf (Oct. 2, 2000) [hereinafter OMB Strategic Plan] (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
54. Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Oversight of the Environmental
Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 182 (Autumn 1991).
55. See id. at 181 (reporting that “in performing its review function, OIRA has focused al-
most exclusively on the cost of regulation and its economic impact”); OMB Strategic Plan, supra
note 53, at 7 (explaining that “OIRA staff tend to focus more on the economic and societal con-
sequences of the regulation”); see also Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rule-
making: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (1986) (“OMB
review . . . places the elimination of cost to industry above all other considerations.”).
56. See Seidenfeld, supra note 51, at 45 (asserting that low-level OIRA officers gain power
from their ability to stop agency action).
57. See Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 456–57 (1987) (“When the President or his staff can secretly intervene
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date applied only to the extent consistent with law, there is a question
whether that mandate nonetheless altered the factors that Congress,
by statute, prescribed for agency rules, and therefore whether the
president exceeded his authority in issuing it.58 The furor over the im-
position of a cost-benefit standard seems to have died down since
President Clinton issued his cost-benefit executive order. The relaxa-
tion of the concern about the standard may reflect the fact that
Clinton’s standard is fuzzier, in that it does not require that all costs
and benefits be reduced to dollar values.59 More likely, however, the
decrease in concern stems from perceptions about the president’s rea-
sons for promulgating the standard. Clinton maintained an image as a
proponent of more efficient but not necessarily more lax regulation.60
Reagan, however, was seen as driven to curtail social regulation, such
as regulation of workplace safety and the environment, and cost-
benefit review provided a convenient mechanism to stop such regula-
tion, or at least to soften the impact of regulation on affected indus-
into any stage of the regulatory process, accountability suffers.”); see also Yvette M. Barksdale,
The Presidency and Administrative Value Selection, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 273, 310 (1993) (“Presi-
dential value selection impoverishes rather than enriches the process for governmental value
selection.”); Morrison, supra note 55, at 1064 (stating that the OMB system “imposes costly de-
lays,” relies on staff “who are neither competent in the substantive areas of regulation, nor ac-
countable to Congress or the electorate,” and “operates in an atmosphere of secrecy and insula-
tion from public debate”).
58. See Colin S. Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 519, 527–28 (1987) (noting
the potential for cost-benefit analysis to allow the White House to induce agencies to rely on
impermissible factors, but arguing that judicial review provides a check against this abuse of ex-
ecutive oversight); Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control Of Agency Rulemaking: An Analy-
sis of Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV.
1199, 1200 (1981) (contending that Reagan’s cost-benefit requirement exceeds the president’s
authority because it displaces agency discretion to weigh relevant factors). But see Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 469, 520–24 (1985) (arguing generally for increased presidential influence over agency de-
cisionmaking as a means of increasing political accountability).
59. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (mandating that “[e]ach agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits
of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify,
propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the in-
tended regulation justify its costs”), with Exec. Order 12,291 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982)
(requiring that “[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to soci-
ety for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society”).
60. Unlike previous presidents, Clinton often personally associated himself with particular
reform efforts that were sympathetic to increased regulation. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2248; see
also Dennis D. Hirsch, Bill and Al’s XL-ent Adventure: An Analysis of the EPA’s Legal Author-
ity to Implement the Clinton Administration’s Project XL, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 140 n.54
(identifying President Clinton and Vice President Gore as the proponents of the Environmental
Protection Agency’s reform project XL).
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tries.61 Thus, Clinton’s agenda was fundamentally consonant with the
interests of the entrenched bureaucracy in the agencies, while
Reagan’s program of cost-benefit review intended to change the insti-
tutional role and ethic of the agencies.62
If that perception was shared by agency staff, then under
Reagan, staff members would have been apt to respond to OMB re-
view by “rigging” their analyses to show that regulations they initially
formulated were cost effective. It is difficult to determine whether this
in fact occurred. There is some evidence that cost-benefit analyses
submitted by agencies tended to show that even more stringent regu-
lations than those proposed would maximize net benefits.63 This might
reflect the agency bolstering support for its proposal, but it also might
reflect that even without OMB oversight, agencies are constrained
from adopting regulations that the public would perceive as too strin-
gent, even when the costs imposed by such regulations are justified.
Even when agency staff members do not perceive OMB as ideo-
logically driven, they may perceive OIRA desk officers as unknowl-
edgeable about the regulations at issue.64 Moreover, in many instances
an agency’s statutory mandate seems to dictate some standard other
than economic efficiency to determine the stringency of regulations.65
Both the perceived ignorance of desk officers and irrelevance of cost-
benefit analysis could translate into staff questioning whether the
desk officers really had any legitimate reason to monitor the eco-
nomic impacts of regulations. According to the psychology of ac-
61. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 21–22 (1991) (noting that, in re-
sponse to Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291, OMB “operat[ed] on the presumption that the
unimpeded market should be the preferred norm” and rejected regulations at an alarming
pace); Percival, supra note 54, at 184 (identifying deregulation as an unstated goal of Reagan’s
regulatory review policies).
62. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2249 (explaining that, although Reagan “worked to dilute
or delay regulatory initiatives, [presidential supervision] served in the Clinton years as part of a
distinctly activist and pro-regulatory governing agenda”).
63. See MCGARITY, supra note 61, at 44 (noting that some regulatory analyses accompa-
nying the reductions of the use of lead in gasoline supported a more stringent standard); see also
id. at 131 (noting that retrospective studies reveal that before-the-fact cost-benefit analyses con-
sistently overestimate compliance costs).
64. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 533, 558 (1989) (“OIRA’s principal officers do not expect expertise or research from
the desk officers.”).
65. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (construing the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s provisions governing health-based standards
for worker exposure to toxic substances as calling for prevention of material health impairment
to the extent feasible, not simply according to a cost-benefit analysis).
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countability, such perceptions would tend to induce the agency to do
a shoddy job on its cost-benefit analyses and simply wait for feedback
from OIRA. Again, the extent to which staff reacted to OMB over-
sight in this fashion is unclear. There is evidence that in some cases
the agency took great pains to consider carefully all costs and benefits
of proposed regulations.66 There are also documented incidents, how-
ever, when the agency simply threw together a rough estimate of a
proposed rule’s economic impact, and the ultimate fate of the rule did
not depend on the lack of care that the agency used in preparing the
analysis.67
B. Knowledge that OMB Will Review the Rule Before the Agency
Commits to It
An agency generally will know at an early stage in the formula-
tion of a rule whether the rule will have a significant economic im-
pact. Hence, the agency usually knows from the proposed rule’s in-
ception whether a cost-benefit analysis is required and whether the
rule’s economic impact will be subject to OMB review. There are in-
stances, of course, when the significance of a rule’s economic impact
will not be known with certainty early in the rulemaking process. But
because the ultimate determination of significance rests with OMB,
agencies are likely to treat such rules as if their impact will be signifi-
cant to avoid rejection on the ground that no regulatory impact analy-
sis was prepared. If perchance the agency erroneously concludes early
in the rulemaking process that a rule will not have a significant im-
pact, then the agency staff will commit to the originally proposed rule
before preparing the cost-benefit analysis. In that case, psychology
predicts that agency staff will engage in a defensive bolstering of the
originally proposed rule beyond what an accurate assessment of eco-
nomic impacts would warrant.
C. OMB Review as Grounded in Process Rather than Outcome
All of the executive orders that have required executive office
oversight of agency rulemaking have specified that the agency is to
66. See MCGARITY, supra note 61, at 47–56 (outlining the Environmental Protection
Agency’s heroic efforts in preparing a cost-benefit analysis for its particulate national ambient
air quality standard).
67. See id. at 68–70 (describing the National Highway Transportation Safety Administra-
tion’s decision to revoke a rule limiting obstructions in automobile drivers’ views, and conclud-
ing that the decision was made without much discussion or analysis).
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submit its own analysis of the costs and benefits of the rule, which in
turn is reviewed by the White House or OMB.68 Similarly, the current
executive order governing OMB review of agency rules does not
mandate that OIRA perform an independent cost-benefit analysis.69
In fact, OIRA does not have the resources in general to prepare such
analyses. Because OIRA desk officers review the analysis submitted
by the agency, on its face, this review is process based.
Review that is process based in appearance still might be out-
come based if the reviewer uses the acceptability of the agency rule as
a sub rosa test for signing off on the agency’s analysis.70 Because in-
dustry often has greater access and influence on OMB and the White
House than more diffuse public interest groups,71 de facto outcome-
based review is most likely when industry has taken a definite stance
on a proposed regulation. In that situation, agency staff might per-
ceive the reviewer as supportive of the industry stance and might fear
that the desk officer at OIRA can obtain independent data, provided
by industry, with which he potentially can impugn the agency’s num-
bers. In such a situation, psychology predicts that the agency is likely
to be less critical in preparing its own cost-benefit analysis but spend
more effort to bolster the analysis once prepared. In the alternative,
the agency might change its proposed rule to a rule more in line with
that favored by industry, which is more likely to comport with what
the agency staff’s perception of what the OIRA desk officer would
prefer.
68. See Percival, supra note 54, at 133, 139, 143, 148 (describing the mandates that Presi-
dents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan imposed on agencies under their respective programs of
executive review of rulemaking).
69. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 646–48 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2000) (authorizing OIRA to review significant regulatory actions, but not providing for
OIRA preparation of its own analyses of agency rules).
70. See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 5 (discussing the psychological effect that the pros-
pect of judicial review has on agency decisionmakers).
71. See Bruff, supra note 64, at 580–81 (noting that “[t]he frequency of [the Reagan
OMB’s] contacts with industry groups opened OMB to a portrayal as special pleader for indus-
try”); Oliver A. Houk, President X and the New (Approved) Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L.
REV. 535, 542 (1987) (“OMB has acted as a conduit for communications from industry oppo-
nents of agency actions.”); see also Percival, supra note 54, at 168–70 (noting how the “Nixon
administration had created an extraordinary mechanism for facilitating secret industry lobbying
[of the Environmental Protection Agency] by establishing the National Industrial Pollution
Control Council”).
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D. Knowledge of the Preferences or Identity of OIRA Reviewers
An agency is unlikely to know the identity of the particular
OIRA desk officer who will be assigned to review the regulatory im-
pact analysis for a proposed rule. Therefore, agency staff members
would not be aware of the particular preferences of the reviewer
when adopting the rule. One might hypothesize that the agency will
equate a desk officer’s preferences with those of the president, and
that therefore OIRA review will influence the rule’s bottom line. Af-
ter all, the staff members of OIRA are political appointees, and a
president is free to choose officers who share his view of regulatory
programs.72 Pragmatically, however, it would be impossible for the
White House to envision the substance of every rule that might come
before a desk officer,73 let alone monitor desk officers’ preferences
perfectly to ensure that they align with those of the president regard-
ing every major rule.74 Hence, for many rules an agency cannot relia-
bly predict the preferences of the OIRA officer who will review the
rule.
Nonetheless, when the president has taken a public stance on the
issues addressed in a rule, agency staff members reasonably could
predict that OIRA will favor that stance. First, those who disagree
with the president’s ideology are unlikely to apply for OIRA desk of-
ficer positions. In addition to this self selection, the political nature of
the selection of such officers will weed out some applicants whose ap-
proach to regulation generally is in tension with that of the president.
Finally, the work of desk officers will be monitored by the director of
OIRA, and that monitoring will induce them to review analyses ac-
72. See Diver, supra note 58, at 531 (noting that during the Reagan administration OIRA
staff members were “as close to the President in perspective and preferences as any group of
appointed officials is likely to be”).
73. Cf. GLEN O. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC
LAW 103 (1991) (discussing the “tenuousness of presidential control” over administrative policy
decisions); Bruff, supra note 64, at 557 (describing the limited resources OIRA brings to its
oversight of agency rules due to the large volume of rules that must be reviewed).
74. See ROBINSON, supra note 73, at 102 (“In fact, these executive intervenors [such as
OMB] are themselves part of the administrative bureaucracy and, as such, present the same
type of monitoring and control problems . . . as the agencies they seek to influence.”); Percival,
supra note 54, at 182 (“[R]egulatory review inevitably involves delegation of responsibility to
lower level staff who may not have a clear sense of the priorities of the president whom they
purportedly represent.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 51, at 14 (“The President and his close personal
aides cannot directly review all or even any significant portion of agency rulemaking deci-
sions.”).
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cording to the White House’s preferences for a particular rule when
those preferences can be discerned.
When the president has not taken a public stance, the agency still
might make some reasonable guesses about the preferences of an
OIRA reviewer. Although each reviewer might have a different take
on the merits of individual rules, they all are trained to conduct cost-
benefit analyses with an eye toward preventing the adoption of un-
necessarily costly rules.75 Hence, agency staff might reasonably pre-
sume that, on balance, OIRA desk officers will favor cheaper alterna-
tives with potentially fewer regulatory benefits over rules that impose
greater costs for the mere possibility of increased benefits. In other
words, OMB review is likely to encourage the agency to propose a
rule that may be less effective but also less costly than the rule the
agency otherwise would consider best.
III.  TRADITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF AGENCY
RULEMAKING
Although theoretically the legislature’s role is to make law that
the executive implements, in the modern administrative state the
Congress by necessity authorizes administrative agencies to make
many rules that regulate private conduct, often with only the broadest
of guidelines about what those rules should be.76 Pragmatically, the
delegation to agencies of broad discretion to formulate rules leaves
Congress primarily the role of overseeing administrative behavior to
prevent agencies from adopting rules or of statutorily overriding rules
with which the legislative body disagrees.77 The process for promul-
75. See Morrison, supra note 55, at 1065 (contending that Reagan used executive oversight
of rulemaking to place “the elimination of cost to industry above all other considerations”);
Percival, supra note 54, at 181 (arguing that OMB review focused inordinately on the cost of
rules).
76. See Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 345, 345 (1987)
(noting that the legitimacy of Congress’s power to delegate broad authority to administrative
agencies recently has faced heavier questioning from critics); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Dele-
gation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 419, 429
(1987) (explaining the functional critique of the nondelegation principle, which argues that only
broad delegations can provide the flexibility needed in a complex modern society); Richard B.
Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 329 (1987) (arguing that increased
reliance on delegating power to administrative agencies has been brought about by a sweeping
expansion of centralized federal command).
77. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Admin-
istrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 509–10 (describing the devices Congress may use to con-
strain agencies other than formal legislative action); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 394 (1989) (contending that modern legisla-
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gating a statute that removes the agency authority to adopt a rule, or
that overrules a rule once adopted, is extremely cumbersome.78 There
are a multitude of individuals and subgroups of Congress—commit-
tees with substantive jurisdiction over a regulatory program, which
must vote out bills overriding rules; their chairs who control commit-
tee agendas; and the leadership of each house, which controls what
bills come to the floor of their respective chambers—who singlehand-
edly can stop such legislation even if virtually the entire Congress
might prefer it.79 The president must be willing to sign the legislation
unless the Congress can amass a two-thirds majority in each house to
override a veto. Not surprisingly, explicit statutory overrides of pro-
posed or adopted rules are rare.80
Congress, however, has mechanisms by which it can use the
threat of legislation to influence agency rulemaking.81 Members of
Congress usually are assigned to the committees of their choice, and
the incentive to be reelected induces many of them to choose commit-
tion acts by authorizing other institutions to implement Congress’s goals, and that delegation
subject to ongoing political control by Congress may be a preferable alternative to detailed
standards).
78. See Farina, supra note 77, at 508 (noting that the time-consuming legislative process
that now prevents Congress from stopping administrative action initially was implemented by
the Framers to prevent Congress from changing public policy too quickly).
79. See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS
81–86 (1984) (discussing the powers of committees and committee chairs); CHARLES TEIFER,
CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, RESEARCH AND LEGISLATIVE
GUIDE 57–58 (1989) (noting that committees can bury legislation and put spins on bills that al-
ter their likelihood of adoption); William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regula-
tion of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74
VA. L. REV. 373, 386–87 (1988) (arguing that policy determinations are made by congressional
committees and therefore are not representative of the congressional majority); see also Arthur
T. Denzau & Robert J. Mackay, Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis
of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior, 27 AM. J. POL. SCI. 740, 741–44 (1983) (describing how
committees can act as gatekeepers to influence legislation that is finally adopted); Tim Grose-
close & David C. King, Committee Theories Reconsidered, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 191,
208–12 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001) (examining the extent
to which subcommittees, committees, and their chairs have gatekeeping power over legislation).
80. Cf. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 252 (1987) (discussing the political costs Congress faces in
passing legislation to override an agency decision).
81. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587–96 (1984) (describing the role of each branch of
government in overseeing administrative action); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureau-
cratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade
Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 768 (1983) (“[C]ongressmen—or, more specifically, par-
ticular congressmen on the relevant committees—possess sufficient rewards and sanctions to
create an incentive system for agencies.”).
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tees that oversee regulatory programs in which their constituents
have a direct interest.82 Hence, committee members are likely to place
greater importance on influencing the rules that come from the
agency programs that their committee oversees than do other mem-
bers of Congress. Mechanisms such as logrolling allow the committee
to make credible threats of overrides of agency action with which the
committee strongly disagrees.83 In addition, agency programs must be
funded every year, and Congress uses the power of the purse to con-
strain agency policy.84 Because there is strong competition for dollars
spent on regulatory programs, programs that do not enjoy the support
of the oversight committee are apt to face cuts in appropriations.85
There are two other mechanisms by which Congress asserts its
influence on agencies. The first involves active monitoring by con-
gressional committees both on a formal and informal level.86 By con-
ducting hearings and investigations into actions that the agency is
considering, a congressional oversight committee both finds out about
the agency’s planned actions and communicates to the agency com-
82. See ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 207
(1996) (discussing reelection as one of the goals influencing the committee assignments that
House members seek); KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE: DEMOCRATIC
COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS IN THE MODERN HOUSE 231–34, 236 (1978); Barry R. Weingast &
William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms,
Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 145–46 (1988) (describing assignment of
legislators to committees as a bidding system in which “legislators seek assignment to those
committees that have the greatest marginal impact over their electoral fortunes”). House mem-
bers’ requests for committee assignments, however, to some extent reflect the probability of
their obtaining those assignments, which may mean that statistics overstate the extent to which
assignments accord with representatives’ underlying committee preferences. SHEPSLE, supra, at
37–38.
83. See Groseclose & King, supra note 79, at 193 (describing how the committee system, in
theory, can facilitate logrolling to the benefit of committee members’ interests).
84. See PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES 55–56 (1989) (noting that the main point of the appropriations process is to
establish significant control over agency action).
85. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1552 (1992) (“[Evidence] suggests that agency policies do respond to
changes in the make-up and prevailing ideology of the agencies’ appropriations committees.”).
86. See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 14–15, 130–44 (1990) (noting that Congress has increased the
amount and the intensity of its oversight since the early 1970s, and describing various methods
Congress uses to exercise oversight); OLESZEK, supra note 79, at 226–28 (stressing the impor-
tance of hearings and investigations as oversight techniques); Kagan, supra note 1, at 2257–58
(discussing both sides of the debate over whether Congress effectively influences agency deci-
sionmaking).
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mittee members’ preferences regarding such actions.87 Given the
threat of cuts in appropriations or statutory limitations on agency
authority, agencies have a strong incentive to conform their actions to
be at least acceptable to the committee chair and a majority of com-
mittee members. The second mechanism is more passive: it involves
committee members waiting until the interest groups that are affected
by proposed agency actions come to them to complain about such ac-
tions. Such complaints act like a fire alarm, which, when rung, stimu-
lates the committee to begin hearings and investigations.88 One sus-
pects that agency staff also maintains contacts with representatives
from affected interest groups and tries to keep such groups suffi-
ciently placated to dissuade them from sounding the alarm to the
oversight committee.89
A. Perceived Legitimacy of Traditional Congressional Review
Our constitutional democracy seems wedded, at least in theory,
to legislative supremacy. Despite the Constitution’s vesting of all the
executive power in one president, Congress has been allowed to dele-
gate to agencies the authority to make ultimate decisions about how
the coercive power of the United States is to be exercised; for most
matters, the president cannot directly countermand an agency adjudi-
catory order, rule, or decision to enforce a rule or statute if Congress
has called for the agency to make that decision.90 Congress even can
87. See MORRIS S. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY 155 (1976) (analyz-
ing the role of hearings as a form of legislative oversight).
88. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 171 (1984) (arguing that a decen-
tralized oversight system, in which Congress responds to specific complaints, is “more effective”
than direct centralized surveillance over administrative agencies).
89. See James A. Thurber, Dynamics of Policy Subsystems in American Politics, in
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 319, 325–26 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 3d ed. 1991)
(describing the role of participants in “policy subsystems,” including interest groups, agencies,
policy specialists, and the media, among others); see also id. at 332 (noting that, even when pol-
icy subsystems are competitive, they often involve repeat players who “try to keep final deci-
sions out of the view of the public”).
90. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2250 (“Congress possesses broad, although not unlimited,
power to structure the relationship between the President and the administration, even to the
extent of creating independent agencies.”); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing
the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995) (“It therefore seems plausible to conclude,
as the conventional view does, that while the President may discharge, he may not otherwise
force decisions, at least if Congress has allocated decisional authority to a particular agency.”);
Strauss, supra note 81, at 649–50 (“Presidential participation, like agency decision, seems possi-
ble only within the area of discretion that a particular law establishes.”); see also EDWARD S.
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prohibit the president from removing the head of an agency who
takes an action with which the president disagrees, so long as that
prohibition does not unduly undermine the president’s ability to per-
form his constitutional functions.91 Congress, to the contrary, has the
power to stop all such action so long as it does so by passing a statute
using constitutionally prescribed procedures.92 Hence, there is no
question about the legitimacy of Congress’s power to reverse agency
rules by legislation or to cut off funds to programs that the agency has
implemented that the legislature does not condone.
B. Knowledge that Congress Will Review the Rule Before the Agency
Commits to It
Staff members of a congressional oversight committee are in
close contact with staff members of the agencies that their committee
oversees.93 Hence, the agency staff is likely to assume that they will
have to answer to some audience, if only congressional staffers, early
in the formulation of the rule. Similarly, representatives of interest
groups directly affected by an agency program are likely to be repeat
players who maintain stable channels of communications with agency
staff members.94 Staff members reasonably could assume that these
representatives too will learn of planned rules early in the formula-
tion process. The psychology of accountability predicts that agency
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 80–81 (4th ed. 1957) (arguing that Congress
must be able to vest ultimate decisionmaking power in agencies for some, but not all, matters).
91. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of
an independent counsel removable only by the attorney general and only with good cause).
92. The government may have to pay compensation if, in reversing an agency action, Con-
gress deprives a person of property that derives from that administrative action or a contractual
entitlement that Congress had authorized the agency to make. See United States v. Winstar
Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895–96 (1996) (“[A]llowing the Government to avoid contractual liability
merely by passing any ‘regulatory statute’ would flout the general principle that, ‘[w]hen the
United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally
by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals.’”). But this just means that indi-
viduals’ property rights are protected against government deprivation by a liability rule, rather
than an injunctive remedy. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Li-
ability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10
(1972) (discussing the distinction between and the appropriate use of property versus liability
rules).
93. See WILLIAM F. WEST, CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACY 132 (1995) (“Committee
members and their staff frequently spend years interacting with the same agency officials, de-
veloping well-defined working relationships in the process.”); see also OLESZEK, supra note 79,
at 232 (describing the importance of personal relationships and informal oversight).
94. See Thurber, supra note 89, at 327 (describing the structure and role of “dominant pol-
icy subsystems”).
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staff members will attempt to placate these monitors by formulating
rules that are more palatable to them than the rules that otherwise
would be sent to the agency head. Knowledge that oversight by con-
gressional staff or interest-group representatives will trigger actions
signaling a threat to the agency’s authority or budget to implement a
planned action is much less certain. If the agency incorrectly predicts
that a rule will not be targeted by congressional staff or industry rep-
resentatives—if the agency is surprised by the convocation of commit-
tee hearings and investigations—then the psychology of accountabil-
ity predicts that agency staff will become more committed to its initial
formulation of the rule and engage in counterproductive bolstering of
that formulation.
C. Congressional Review as Grounded in Outcome Rather than
Process
By traditional accounts, members of Congress are not concerned
with the care that an agency takes in adopting a rule, or the reasons
that lead the agency to promulgate the rule. Rather, they have an
overriding interest in whether the final agency rule accords with their
particular preferences. As one of the early students of congressional
oversight phrased it:
For the committee member there was no abstract meaning in the
term “proper” when used to describe the relationship between the
independent commission and the committee. Anything was proper
that served to bring the agency . . . into accord with the members’
view of how the agency should act.95
That early view of Congress members’ attitudes toward oversight
is supported by more recent literature that models this congressional
function. Models invariably assume that Congress, or some influential
subset thereof, reacts when the predicted agency outcome deviates
from the legislative body’s preferences.96 The view is supported as
95. Seymour Scher, Congressional Committee Members as Independent Agency Overseers:
A Case Study, 54 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 911, 919 (1960); see also DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra
note 82, at 334 (quoting Clinton White House officials as complaining that members of Con-
gress use oversight hearings not to improve government performance but rather to gum up the
works and intimidate those who are carrying out the laws passed by Congress).
96. See, e.g., Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountabil-
ity, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 97–99 (Winter 1994) (discussing a model that sought to
explain how legislators’ policy goals affect their roles in overseeing administrative agencies);
Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Manage-
ment, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 244–45 (Spring 1994)
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well by descriptions of particular instances in which Congress engages
in oversight. Even when Congress focuses on agency decisionmaking
processes, it seems to do so as a means either of protecting its own
power to counteract presidential influence over agency policy,97 or as
a means of achieving specific policy preferences.98 Thus, although one
cannot conclude that Congress is indifferent to agency processes for
promulgating rules, Congress’s procedural concerns are not the kind
that the psychology literature demonstrates hold the potential to im-
prove the quality of agency rulemaking.
D. Knowledge of the Preferences or Identity of Congressional
Committee Members
As previously noted, even when review is nominally process
based, a decisionmaker will react as if it is outcome based when the
decisionmaker has information about the preferences of his audience
or from which he can infer those preferences.99 When, as for congres-
sional review, accountability is not even nominally designed to be
process based, the impact of knowing the preferences of the reviewers
is likely to influence the outcome of agency decisions to an even
greater extent.
Agency staff often works closely with the staff of its oversight
committees and is well aware of the identities of the members of
those committees.100 Legislators are assigned to an oversight commit-
(analyzing the interaction between the branches of government in the process of crafting legisla-
tion); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1989) (describing
Congress as a “watchdog” that monitors agency performance).
97. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy,
46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 25 (1994) (attributing the increasing tendency of Congress to impose
deadlines and other procedures that reflect micromanagement of agency decisionmaking to
competition with the White House for control over the bureaucracy); see also OGUL, supra note
87, at 16–18 (discussing the effect of executive-legislative relations on congressional oversight
behavior).
98. Cf. CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 8–9 (1988) (arguing that the un-
certainties surrounding policy “ends” encourages congressional overseers to “focus more short-
sightedly on immediately placating constituencies and policing agency procedures—a preoccu-
pation with means related only imperfectly to policy [ends]”); McGarity, supra note 8, at 1405
(contending that analytic requirements are important vehicles for congressional control of ad-
ministrative discretion).
99. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
100. See WEST, supra note 93, at 132 (discussing the importance of informal oversight and
the everyday interactions among committee members, staff, and agency officials).
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tee primarily because they have an interest in being on that commit-
tee.101 Often, committee members have a readily identifiable constitu-
ency with an interest in the outcome of regulatory programs that
members oversee,102 and members may have taken public stands
about the issues that such programs address. Chairs of such commit-
tees are especially apt to have expressed opinions publicly on issues
confronting an agency, and they often have the power to stop a legis-
lative response to agency action. Thus, those who work on formulat-
ing rules know both the identity of their audience and the outcome it
desires and, according to the psychological literature, will alter the
rules to better comport with those desires.103 In other words, tradi-
tional congressional oversight of agency rulemaking may induce the
agency to tailor the rule to the preferences of members of the over-
sight committee, especially the chairpersons of such committees. The
fact that committee members rely on congressional staff members and
representatives of affected interest groups to monitor agency activity
and report problems to the committee complicates the picture
slightly. Agency staff may have a sufficiently close relationship with
such monitors that it aims to satisfy them, thereby avoiding any report
to the committee. If so, then the relevant audience is not the oversight
committee; it is the monitors.104 But the psychological prediction that
the agency will write the rule to satisfy its audience remains the same.
Most significantly, the outcome-based nature of congressional review
and the knowledge of the identity and preferences of oversight com-
mittee members will dissuade agency staff from engaging in careful
self-critical reasoning about the rule.
101. See id. at 161 (noting that committee assignments can help a legislator serve constitu-
ents and win favor from interests that can contribute to reelection efforts).
102. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 82, at 207; see also WEST, supra note 93, at
162–63 (agreeing that committee oversight can lead to encouragement of agencies to pursue
narrow policy goals, but also noting that such characterizations of the influence of oversight
must be tempered in important respects).
103. See Weingast & Moran, supra note 81, at 777 (discussing the theory that the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) rules that Congress eventually found to be radical and unacceptable
reflected the preferences of the members of the Senate oversight subcommittee responsible for
oversight of the Commission when the rules were formulated).
104. That congressional staff members act as go-betweens for their committees and the
agency staff may lead the agency to placate interests that deviate from those of the oversight
committee. See JAMES W. FESLER & DONALD F. KETTL, THE POLITICS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 280–81 (1991) (“[S]taff members purport to be representing their
committees but in fact may be representing only themselves.”). But see OGUL, supra note 87, at
14 (“Professional staff members will usually mirror the policy and process orientations of the
congressmen who hire them and direct their behavior.”).
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IV.  FAST-TRACK CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES
In 1996, the legislature passed the Congressional Review Act,
which provides for fast-track review of agency rules.105 When an
agency promulgates a rule covered by the Act, it must submit reports
to the comptroller general and to each house of Congress.106 Those
reports must include the rule and a concise general statement in sup-
port of the rule, as well as any other analyses that the agency was ob-
ligated by statute or executive order to prepare with respect to the
rule.107 The Act provides procedures governing joint resolutions dis-
approving the rule, when such resolutions are introduced within sixty
days of the receipt of the agency report.108 In the Senate, if a commit-
tee with jurisdiction over the rule does not report out a joint resolu-
tion of disapproval within twenty days of receiving the agency report,
the rule may be put on the calendar of the entire chamber by written
petition of thirty senators.109 Once introduced, the process for consid-
ering a disapproval resolution in the Senate is expedited: the resolu-
tion may not be amended, postponed, or subject to any point of order
against it, and debate on the resolution is limited to ten hours, after
which the senior chamber can simply vote the resolution up or
down.110 Although the Act includes no internal mechanism for forcing
a joint resolution of disapproval out of a committee in the House or
expediting a resolution that has been introduced in that chamber, if
the Senate votes to approve such a resolution, the House must con-
sider it without the matter going to a committee, and the House must
vote on the resolution as passed by the Senate.111 Thus, the entire fast-
105. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
§ 251, 110 Stat. 857, 868–74 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2000)). For more complete de-
scriptions of the Congressional Review Act, see Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congres-
sional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 99–102 (1997); Morton Rosenberg,
Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking?: A Brief Overview, As-
sessment, and Proposal for Reform, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1051, 1053–57 (1999).
106. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A)–(B).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 802(a).
109. Id. § 802(c).
110. Id. § 802(d).
111. Id. § 802(f). The extent to which the Act expedites review may be limited by its lack of
procedural limitations for disapproval resolutions in the House of Representatives. See Rosen-
berg, supra note 105, at 1063 (speculating that the lack of an expedited consideration procedure
in the House of Representatives could deter quick review in the House, and that the House’s
inaction could in turn discourage expedited review in the Senate, where time is limited). There
is, however, less need for procedures to expedite consideration in the House than in the Senate,
because the House rules provide mechanisms by which a majority of that chamber can bring
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track process is meant to speed up consideration by limiting the op-
portunity for committees to block consideration of joint resolutions
and by preventing a filibuster of the resolution in the Senate.
The statutory architecture of fast-track review manifests an in-
tent that such motions be made shortly after the agency issues its rule.
The Congressional Review Act applies fast-track procedures only to
joint resolutions of disapproval that have been introduced within sixty
days of the agency publishing a rule and submitting reports on the
rule to Congress.112 The Act also prohibits major rules—those that
have the greatest regulatory impact and hence the greatest potential
to induce reliance by regulated entities—from becoming effective un-
til at least sixty days after they are adopted by the agency and pub-
lished in the Federal Register.113 This sixty-day stay allows the intro-
duction of a disapproval resolution for a major rule before the rule
becomes effective. The only significant exceptions to the sixty-day
stay for major rules allow such a rule to go into effect if a motion for a
joint resolution of disapproval of a rule is voted down by either house
of Congress,114 or if the president considers that the situation
prompting the rule warrants the rule’s going into effect immedi-
ately.115 Once the resolution is defeated there is no longer any possi-
bility that the rule will be overturned by fast-track review and there-
fore no justification for continuing to stay the rule.
Until recently, Congress lacked an effective mechanism for col-
lecting the requisite information to screen rules to determine which
might warrant serious review; fast-track review relied almost exclu-
sively on agency analyses and explanations for their rules.116 The
comptroller general has fifteen days to report to Congress on every
bills out of committee, TEIFER, supra note 79, at 252, and the House leadership can limit debate
and amendment of bills from the floor, see id. at 263–74 (describing the role of the House Rules
Committee in structuring floor debate on bills).
112. 5 U.S.C. § 802(a).
113. Id. § 801(a)(3).
114. Id. § 801(a)(5).
115. Id. § 801(c). The president can make such a determination in the case of an imminent
threat to health or safety, as a necessary measure to ensure national security or enforce the
criminal laws, or in other emergency situations. Id. One exception to the sixty-day stay that does
not involve an emergency is for major rules “issued pursuant to any statute implementing an
international trade agreement.” Id. § 801(c)(2)(D). This exception reflects both that Congress
has already authorized issuance of rules to implement the particular agreement and that the
president plays a unique role in the area of international affairs.
116. See Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 1061 (suggesting that this lack of screening made it
difficult for committees to prioritize adequately and give proper consideration to the rules be-
fore them).
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agency rule,117 but he has interpreted this obligation only to mandate
that the report verify that the agency has performed and submitted to
Congress all of the analyses that the Congressional Review Act re-
quired to accompany the rule.118 The full Senate or the House leader-
ship always can demand that an oversight committee report a joint
resolution of disapproval for a rule out to the full chamber, but the
short time frame envisioned by fast-track review ensures that any
committee report accompanying the resolution will be cursory com-
pared to the detailed analyses provided by the agencies, unless per-
haps the committee had been able to anticipate, before an agency ac-
tually adopted a rule, that a resolution seeking disapproval of the rule
would be introduced. Moreover, the expedited nature of the fast-
track process makes it difficult for Congress to meaningfully assess
the agency data and explanations.119
Last year, Congress passed the Truth in Regulating Act,120 which
allows a chair or ranking minority member of a committee with over-
sight jurisdiction for a major rule to request from the comptroller
general a report that includes an independent evaluation of the rule.121
Such an independent evaluation must include a substantive evalua-
tion of the agency’s data, methodology, and assumptions used in de-
veloping the rule as well as an explanation of how that evaluation
supports or detracts from the agency’s conclusions regarding the
rule.122 The independent evaluation must assess the agency’s cost-
benefit analysis, including its evaluation of alternatives to the rule,
federalism concerns, and any other analysis that statutes or executive
orders require the agency to prepare.123 The comptroller general’s re-
port might provide a mechanism by which legislators can identify
rules whose accompanying analyses are flawed and, ultimately, am-
munition that opponents of a rule can use to seek a joint resolution of
disapproval.
117. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(2)(A).
118. See Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 1054–55 (explaining that such a narrow interpreta-
tion limits the comptroller general’s inquiry to whether certain procedural steps were taken).
119. Cf. id. at 1063 (noting some of the practical difficulties that the expedited time frame
for a joint resolution of disapproval poses for meaningful independent analysis of agency rules,
and calling for a meshing of the mechanism for screening significant rules with expedited re-
view).
120. Truth in Regulating Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-312, 114 Stat. 1248 (codified at 5
U.SC. § 801 (2000)).
121. Id. § 4(a)(1)–(2).
122. Id. § 3(3).
123. Id. § 4(a)(3).
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A. Perceived Legitimacy of Fast-Track Review
There is little question of the legitimacy of fast-track review. As
noted earlier with respect to traditional congressional oversight of
administrative agency action, despite the fact that the Constitution
vests all executive power in the president, the nation has come to ac-
cept Congress’s authority to monitor and oversee agency activity.124
The Supreme Court consistently has held that Congress has broad
leeway to structure administrative agencies.125 Although no court has
ruled expressly on Congress’s right to obtain information from the
executive branch, Congress has criminalized refusals by executive of-
ficials to comply with congressional subpoenas, and the courts have
declined to grant executive officials blanket exemption from such
laws.126 Because fast-track review ultimately depends on passage of a
joint resolution—a legislative act that requires a vote of the majority
of both houses and presentment to the president—its constitutional
status is solid and its legitimacy unquestionable.127 Thus, there is no
 124. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
125. In particular, Congress can vest administrative officials with authority to act that cannot
be overridden by presidential edict. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2250 (explaining the conven-
tional view that Congress can insulate the discretionary decisions of removable administrative
officials from presidential control); Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A
Comment on the Supreme Court’s Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 809 (noting
that Congress may delegate rulemaking authority to an agency as long as the authority has been
delegated within clearly defined limits that a court could review to judge compliance). Congress
also can insulate officials from being fired based merely on the grounds that the president dis-
agrees with their decisions. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695–96 (1988) (allowing Con-
gress to create an independent counsel who could not be removed by the president, because es-
tablishing this office did not impermissibly undermine the power of the executive branch);
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618–19, 631–32 (1935) (permitting Con-
gress to restrict the president’s removal power over officials who perform nonexecutive func-
tions such as adjudication and rulemaking, and striking down the removal without cause of an
FTC commissioner).
126. See United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 151–52 (D.D.C. 1983)
(declining to exercise the court’s discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act to consider
whether executive privilege protected Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) documents
subject to a congressional subpoena, and ruling that the matter should be decided in the context
of a prosecution of the EPA administrator for contempt).
127. Prior to 1986, Congress tended to rely on legislative vetoes as the major means for
threatening a reversal of an agency rule. Between 1932 and 1975, Congress passed 196 statutes
that authorized 295 veto-type procedures, often giving either house, or even the oversight com-
mittee of either house, the power to reject an agency rule. James Abourezk, The Congressional
Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND.
L.J. 323, 324 (1977). After the Supreme Court held that such vetoes were unconstitutional be-
cause legislative action could be effective only if agreed to by both houses and presented to the
president for his signature, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955–59 (1983), some scholars expressed
concern that, in light of pragmatic needs for Congress to make broad delegations of policymak-
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reason to believe that agency staff would consider congressional over-
ride, even if by fast-track review, to be a matter not properly within
the purview of Congress. In addition, because fast-track review occurs
at the end of the rulemaking process, it would not be perceived as an
attempt by Congress to force agency staff to modify their regulatory
values.
B. Knowledge that Congress Will Engage in Fast-Track Review of a
Rule Before the Agency Commits to It
Technically, all rules are subject to congressional fast-track re-
view. Agencies, however, promulgate several thousand rules a year,
and Congress cannot review anywhere near that number.128 Further-
more, the expedited nature of fast-track review makes it almost im-
possible for Congress to obtain sufficient information to review the
substance of the agency rulemaking decision on any basis other than
pure politics. Although the Truth in Regulating Act promises General
Accounting Office (GAO) review of agency data and analyses that
would increase the propensity of Congress to use fast-track review, it
remains to be seen whether that office will provide sufficient informa-
tion for Congress to evaluate the merits of agency rules on a meaning-
ful basis. First, it is not clear whether GAO has sufficient resources to
provide the kind of information Congress will need to evaluate
agency rules.129 Even assuming that the GAO has the resources to
perform such evaluations, the Truth in Regulating Act mandates that
the comptroller general submit the report to the requesting commit-
tee within 180 days, well after the time frame for fast-track review.130
In addition, the Act refrained from requiring GAO to provide Con-
ing authority to agencies, the legislative veto was justified to ensure that regulatory decision-
making remained politically accountable. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After
Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 787–88 (1984) (discussing the “classic conflict in the administrative
state between political accountability and the necessary complexity of regulatory decisionmak-
ing”). Fast-track review was meant, at least in part, to provide such a threat that did not run
afoul of the Constitution’s provisions governing the passage of legislation.
128. See Cohen & Strauss, supra note 105, at 103 (arguing that review of each regulatory
action would require enormous staff effort and consume precious legislative resources).
129. The General Accounting Office requested a total of $7.8 million to implement the
Truth In Regulating Act of 2000 for fiscal years 2001 and 2002, see U.S. General Accounting
Office, Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Request, GAO-01-809T, at 9 (June 26, 2001), available at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=d01809t.txt&dir
ectory=/diskb/wais/data/gao (on file with the Duke Law Journal), but the Act provides only an
additional $5.2 million for fiscal years 2000 through 2002. Truth in Regulating Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-312, § 5, 114 Stat. 1248, 1249 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2000)).
130. Truth in Regulating Act § 4(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 1249.
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gress with its own data and analyses that legislators could use to de-
cide whether an agency rulemaking process and justification warrant
more detailed inquiry. Although Congress appears to have given
some consideration to imposing such a mandate on the comptroller
general,131 that mandate would be extremely costly to implement.132
Thus, at best it seems as though GAO will be able to provide the kind
of information necessary for Congress to meaningfully evaluate
agency rulemaking only for the highest profile regulations.133 In prac-
tice, it is likely that fast-track review will continue to focus only on
rules that are so notoriously controversial when promulgated that
they attract congressional debate during the rulemaking process.
In addition, because joint resolutions must be presented to the
president for his signature, agencies know that if the president sup-
ports the rule at issue, then sponsors of a resolution of disapproval
must muster a vote of two-thirds of members in each house or at least
find the rule sufficiently important to trade votes on other legislation
in return for the president’s signature on the resolution. Hence, it
should come as no surprise that in the three years following authori-
zation of fast-track review, agencies issued over 15,000 rules, but only
eight motions for disapproval covering six rules had been introduced
in Congress,134 and one of these was introduced only so it could be
voted down, allowing the rule to go into effect prior to the sixty-day
waiting period usually applicable to major rules.135 Congress has
adopted only one resolution under fast-track review,136 although a
second attempted resolution led the agency to agree to suspend the
131. See Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 1061 (discussing proposed legislation to create a
Congressional Office of Regulatory Affairs and to have that office prepare its own cost-benefit
analyses of agency rules).
132. See id. at 1063 (asserting that a review committee that performed cost-benefit analysis
from scratch rather than using agency data would be extraordinarily expensive).
133. The Truth in Regulating Act implicitly concedes that the GAO will not have the re-
sources to fulfill all committee requests for evaluations by allowing the comptroller general dis-
cretion to determine “the priority and number of requests . . . for which a report will be submit-
ted.” Truth in Regulating Act § 4(a)(4), 114 Stat. at 1249.
134. See Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 1058 (summarizing utilization of the review mecha-
nism since 1996).
135. See id. at 1060 (describing the procedural gymnastics surrounding the enactment of a
rule that dealt with annual revision of rates for reimbursement of Medicare providers).
136. Statement of President George W. Bush upon Signing S.J. Res. 6, 37 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 477 (Mar. 20, 2001).
SEIDENFELD.DOC 02/05/02 10:38 AM
2001] PSYCHOLOGY OF ACCOUNTABILITY 1089
rule, and a third led to limiting legislation in a subsequent appropria-
tion bill.137
The paucity of motions for disapproval resolutions indicates that
agencies are not apt to focus on fast-track review as a check on their
rulemaking discretion at least until late in the rulemaking process.
Agencies might be likely to focus on such review when they adopt
rules that they know will be unpopular in Congress, but even then
they need not fear the ramifications of fast-track review unless they
also believe that the president opposes the rule or is willing to com-
promise it to win other political battles. Fast-track review may have
greater significance for midnight rules that are subject to review when
a different president—one who might not support the rule—is in of-
fice.138 But controversial rules usually take years to promulgate,139 and
an agency is unlikely to know that a rule will be issued in the waning
moments of a president’s term until very late in the process—too late
to cause the agency to take more care in its rule formulation.
137. See Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 1058–59 (describing the procedural and political ma-
nipulation with regard to an Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rule and
a Health Care Financing Administration rule).
138. Thus, it is not surprising that OSHA’s ergonomics rule—the one rule that Congress has
overridden by fast-track review—was such a midnight rule. See, e.g., Mike Allen, Bush Signs
Repeal of Ergonomics Rules; Administration Promises Business-Friendly Workplace Safety
Regulations, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2001, at A6 (highlighting the swift repeal of workplace
safety regulations as one of the most far-reaching actions of the early days of the George W.
Bush presidency); Lizette Alvarez, Senate G.O.P. Moving to Nullify Clinton Rules on Worker
Injuries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at A1 (remarking on the extensive mobilization among poli-
ticians and business leaders to repeal ergonomics rules that were ten years in the making); Jay
Cochran III, Clinton’s “Cinderellas” Face Regulatory Midnight, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2000, at
17A (reviewing the last-minute attempts by Clinton agency heads to pass regulations).
139. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1283–84 (1997) (finding that, on average, EPA legislative rules
take about three years to promulgate, regardless of whether negotiated rulemaking is used);
Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theory, 2
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 113, 134 (1992) (finding that negotiated rulemaking shaves
about eleven months from the EPA’s rulemaking process); U.S. General Accounting Office,
Federal Rulemaking: Procedural and Analytical Requirements at OSHA and Other Agencies,
GAO-01-852T, at 1 (June 14, 2001), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/
useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=d01852t.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao (on
file with the Duke Law Journal) (citing the National Advisory Committee on Occupational
Safety and Health, Report and Recommendations Related to OSHA’s Standards Development
Process, June 6, 2000, for the proposition that it takes OSHA an average of ten years to
promulgate a health or safety standard).
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C. Fast-Track Review as Grounded in Outcome Rather than Process
As with most decisions by Congress, what matters most for fast-
track review is the bottom line, not how the agency got there. The
significance of the bottom line is further enhanced because of the lack
of time for any real deliberation about the merits of the rule. The
Truth in Regulating Act might introduce some process-based compo-
nents into the fast-track oversight process. Under that Act, recall,
GAO is to evaluate the agency analyses of costs and benefits, impacts
on small businesses, and federalism effects, as well as alternative ap-
proaches set forth in the rulemaking record.140 The extent to which
GAO will be able to prepare reports that provide meaningful infor-
mation regarding agency analyses for a significant number of rules,
and whether the availability of GAO’s information will alter the ten-
dency of Congress to focus on outcome without concern for process,
remain to be seen.
D. Knowledge of the Preferences or Identity of the Reviewers
The audience for fast-track review is known; it is Congress as a
whole. Hence, when an agency from the outset envisions a high prob-
ability that a rule will be subjected to fast-track review, one might hy-
pothesize that the agency is likely to modify the rule to come closer to
the outcome that the agency believes a majority of Congress supports.
There are, however, many factors that complicate the influence of re-
view under the fast-track process. As noted, the agency may not fear
the wrath of the entire Congress so long as it believes that the presi-
dent will support its rule.141 Or, put another way, the president too be-
comes an audience who must be appeased under fast-track review. In
addition, the agency rulemaking process has become drawn out. Even
if the current Congress dislikes a planned rule, there is a chance that
when an agency first formulates the rule, it will discount the likeli-
hood of congressional intervention because of the uncertainty about
where Congress might stand on that rule when it is promulgated years
down the road. Finally, although oversight and appropriation commit-
tees and their chairs cannot shield an agency from a fast-track resolu-
tion of disapproval, they can protect the agency from other sanctions,
such as a loss of funding and substantive limitations on agency
140. See Truth in Regulating Act § 4(a)(3), 114 Stat. at 1249; see supra notes 120–23, 129–33
and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
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authority, independent of the disapproval resolution.142 Hence, so long
as an agency is assured that it can survive a vote on such a resolution,
the fast-track mechanism adds nothing to the influence that particular
members of Congress already wield over agency rulemaking.
CONCLUSION—POLITICAL REVIEW VIEWED THROUGH THE LENS
OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ACCOUNTABILITY
A. The Likely Impact of Political Review
The previous analysis of OMB, congressional, and fast-track re-
view indicates that, according to the psychology of accountability,
each mechanism is likely to have some unique impact on the behavior
of agency staff members who formulate agency rules. Of the three
mechanisms, OMB review holds the greatest promise for improving
the quality of staff decisionmaking. The agency knows that any rule
with a significant economic impact will be subject to OMB review.
This review is nominally process based, and when agency staff begins
formulating the rule, it usually will not know the identity of the par-
ticular desk officer assigned to scrutinize the agency’s cost-benefit
analysis. For rules that attract significant political attention early on,
however, the agency is apt to equate the preferences of the desk offi-
cer with the publicly announced views of the White House. This in
turn will encourage the agency to formulate rules that are closer to
the preferences of the president than the agency would if it were not
subject to OMB review. An agency is also likely to presume that desk
officers will be preoccupied with regulatory cost,143 which will induce
the agency to adopt economically conservative rules rather than rules
that promise uncertain but potentially large benefits at a certain and
significant cost.
Traditional congressional oversight is unlikely to improve the
care of agency staff analyses or the propensity of the staff to use in-
appropriate decision rules and to succumb to heuristic biases. Con-
gressional review is unlikely to improve the quality of agency formu-
lation of rules primarily because Congress cares almost exclusively
about particular outcomes rather than the process that the agency
142. See Weingast & Moran, supra note 81, at 768–69 (describing the various means by
which “particular congressmen on the relevant committees” can influence the decisions of
agency heads).
143. See supra notes 54–55, 75 and accompanying text.
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uses to formulate rules.144 For this same reason, traditional congres-
sional review might influence agency staff decisionmaking in either of
two ways: it might induce the agency staff to become defensive about
its initial rule preference or it might cause the staff to formulate a rule
more in line with the preferences of influential members of Congress
—for example chairs of oversight committees. The agency is more
likely to engage in defensive bolstering if the agency formulated its
initial rule preference believing, incorrectly, that the rule would not
generate significant oversight attention.145 If the rule later does gener-
ate such attention, psychology predicts that agency staff members will
try especially hard to find information that confirms their initial
choice and to generate persuasive post hoc rationalizations for this
choice.146 If the agency knows from the inception of a proposed rule
that the rule will attract oversight committee attention, and if it
knows or reasonably can guess at the outcome preferences of influen-
tial committee members, then the agency staff is likely to promulgate
a rule that is more in line with these preferences than the rule would
be absent congressional oversight.147
Fast-track review is the least likely of the mechanisms canvassed
in this Essay to encourage significant change in agency decisionmak-
ing. Because in theory every rule is subject to fast-track review by the
entire Congress, one might conjecture that this review mechanism will
encourage agencies to gear their rules to the median voter in Con-
gress.148 In fact, however, few rules ever face scrutiny of the full legis-
144. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
145. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 26, at 257 (finding that people’s opinions about deci-
sions tend to polarize if there is a delay in questioning them).
146. See Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, in ADVANCES
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41, 44 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986); David San-
bonmatsu et al., Overestimating Causality: Attributional Effects of Confirmatory Processing, 65 J.
PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 892, 893 (1993) (describing the tendency of people to search selectively
for confirmatory evidence of their judgment and to ignore alternatives). The tendency to seek
confirmation of a hypothesis, however, is complex; it can lead to a decisionmaker’s searching for
easily rebutted but seemingly conflicting evidence as well as confirming evidence. Frey, supra, at
52–53.
147. See Cvetkovich, supra note 35, at 154 (finding that people take more time and have bet-
ter recall of issues when evaluating policies that imply social accountability).
148. “The median voter theorem predicts that to the extent that support will be determined
by substantive compromise along a single issue dimension, the dominant position necessary to
gain majority support will be at or near the median voter.” Maxwell L. Stearns, From Lujan to
Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of Environmental Standing, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321,
346 (2001). For discussions of the median voter theorem and the extent to which it accurately
describes voting systems, see generally Randall G. Holcombe, An Empirical Test of the Median
Voter Model, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 260 (1980) (finding that for educational expenditures the me-
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lature, and pragmatically those that do will not be reversed unless the
president as well as a majority of Congress is willing to disapprove of
them.149 One also might contend that the fast-track mechanism might
focus attention on some rules, and thereby facilitate congressional re-
taliation by means other than disapproval against an agency that
promulgates a rule that Congress disfavors. But the mechanisms for
such retaliation would involve the usual legislative processes that are
subject to the influence of influential committee members. Hence, the
agency is unlikely to react differently to the threat of illumination via
the fast-track process than it is to the threat of traditional oversight.
B. The Need for Judicial Review in Light of Political Review
In a companion article to this Essay,150 I evaluate judicial review
of agency action under the arbitrary and capricious standard using the
psychology of accountability and conclude that such review helps to
improve the care with which agencies formulate rules, alleviate cogni-
tive decisionmaking biases, and counter pathologies in group deci-
sionmaking. Based on my analysis in this Essay, viewed through the
lens of the psychology of accountability, political review is unlikely to
substitute for judicial review in providing such benefits. Unlike judi-
cial review, none of the mechanisms for political review satisfy the
four criteria that psychologists have found necessary for accountabil-
ity to improve the quality of decisionmaking.151 OMB review might
encourage the agency to take greater care in formulating rules, but
not for every rule subject to review. Moreover, because the agency is
apt to presume OIRA desk officers have a preoccupation with regula-
dian voter model provides a good explanation of reality); Harold Hotelling, Stability in Compe-
tition, 39 ECON. J. 43, 41–57, 54–55 (1929) (describing the tendency of political parties to make
their platforms as similar as possible to appeal to the median voter); Thomas Romer & Howard
Rosenthal, The Elusive Median Voter, 12 J. PUB. ECON. 143 (1979) (evaluating empirical studies
that purport to show that government expenditures reflect the desires of the median voter);
Charles K. Rowley, The Relevance of the Median Voter Theorem, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 104 (1984) (questioning whether the spatial model accurately captures
the dynamics of political markets).
149. By public choice accounts, the need for the president’s signature changes the impact of
the fast-track process from one which favors the median voter to one which gives the agency
discretion to adopt a rule anywhere in a policy region where any change in the rule will be disfa-
vored by the House, the Senate, or the president. See McCubbins et al., supra note 96, at 438–39
(arguing that agency drift from policy choice will go uncorrected as long as it remains within the
boundaries of approved outcomes by the House, Senate, and president).
150. Seidenfeld, supra note 5.
151. See supra notes 27–46 and accompanying text.
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tory costs, OMB review generally will bias the outcome of agency
rulemaking toward economically conservative rules.
C. Should These Forms of Political Review Be Retained?
One conception of agencies and rulemaking—the formalistic
conception—views the administrative state as a means of imple-
menting the will of the legislature.152 Granting discretion in the rule-
making process to agencies allows the regulatory system flexibility to
respond to changes in circumstances and political preferences.153 Such
a grant of authority spares proponents of regulatory change from
having to overcome congressional inertia. If checks on rulemaking are
sufficient to make the agency accountable to the political branches,
those branches should prefer this mechanism as long as the value to
them of allowing accountable flexibility exceeds the value of ce-
menting their current policies in place. Given this understanding of
the role of rulemaking, the mechanisms of political oversight serve
the purpose of keeping the agency in line with values of the polity as
represented by their elected legislators and officials.154 Even under
this understanding, however, some of the mechanisms pose problems
because there is no guarantee that the agency’s perceived audience or
reviewer (e.g., the chairs of oversight committees, or even the presi-
dent) holds the values of the polity.
An alternative conception of agencies and rulemaking—the pub-
lic interest conception—views the administrative apparatus as geared
to balance the values that the authorizing statute means to serve and
thereby to further the interests of the citizenry.155 Under this concep-
152. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION 28 (1988) (asserting that one role of an administrator is to engage in statutory
interpretation to carry out the goals of the legislature); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1672–73 (1975) (stating that the legisla-
ture must promulgate rules, standards, and goals to guide the exercise of administrative power).
153. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Deci-
sions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 96–98 (1985) (noting that the delegation of rulemaking authority
allows executive responsiveness to shifts in voter preferences); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political
Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391,
404–05 (1987) (arguing that there is a need to permit agencies the discretion to allow policies to
evolve gradually over time).
154. See Steven Shimburg, Checks and Balance: Limitations on the Power of Congressional
Oversight, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 245 (Autumn 1991) (arguing that one cannot le-
gitimately criticize oversight for skewing the EPA’s priorities toward those of Congress).
155. See SHAPIRO, supra note 152, at 28 (suggesting that administrative deliberation may
involve philosophic discourse about basic values to guide policy choices); Steven P. Croley,
Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 65–76
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tion, in essence, the agency is to use its expertise to adopt the rule
that best serves these values, given technological and economic con-
straints. Political review then may interfere with the agency’s role by
pushing the agency away from the best solution in terms of underly-
ing prescribed values toward the particular solution that is preferred
by the political actors to whom the agency answers. Under this con-
ception, there still may be a role for political review to protect against
the agency implementing a balance that is clearly unacceptable to the
current polity.156 But it would seem that in those rare circumstances,
Congress and the president likely would agree to legislation overrul-
ing the agency regulation. OMB or fast-track review may be neces-
sary for political review to overcome the influence of congressional
committees with idiosyncratic regulatory preferences.157 Generally,
however, from this perspective, judicial review to ensure the legality
and wisdom of agency decisions would seem a better choice to ensure
that the agency takes care in implementing its statutory responsibili-
ties.
(1998) (giving an overview of the main principles and critiques of public interest theory); see
also Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 174–75 (1990) (arguing that, at
least in part, regulators pursue public interests that are distinguishable from their private inter-
ests).
156. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 481–82 (1999) (discussing Congress’s role in forcing the
president to replace the EPA administrator when he attempted to undermine the enforcement
of environmental protection laws).
157. See Weingast & Moran, supra note 81, at 778–80 (describing the preferences of influen-
tial senators that deviated from those of the chamber generally, and noting how the agency that
those senators monitored acted in accordance with their preferences).
